Today's crop has several more patents where the examiner was satisfied that the essentially manual methods were "computer implemented," and a few where it's pretty clear that there is no computer at all. I don't find these cases particularly interesting since most are just holdovers from a pre-Bilski era. It's pretty clear (to me, anyway) that they probably shouldn't have been allowed under today's standards. Examples include U.S. Patent Nos.:
- 7,509,287 ("electrically calculating...")
- 7,509,284 to BGC Partners (linked to a non-descript "trading system")
- 7,509,278 ("using a computer to...")
- 7,509,261 to FHLMC ("electronically calculating...")
- 7,509,190 to Tenaska Power Services (completely manual)
More interesting, however, is one of today's patents that requires a little extra thought about the particularity of the machine. Key terms are in bold.
U.S. Patent No. 7,509,292 Authentication of consumable items
Assignee: Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd. 1. A method for validating the authenticity of an untrusted chip, the method includes the steps of: a) generating a random number and applying an asymmetric encrypt function to the random number using a public key to produce a first variable; b) passing the first variable to the untrusted chip; c) receiving a third variable together with a data message read from the untrusted chip, the third variable having been generated, in the untrusted chip, by a process including: d) decrypting the first variable with an asymmetric decrypt function using a secret key to produce a second variable, the public and secret keys being a public-private key pair; e) applying the asymmetric encrypt function to the second variable together with the data message using the secret key to produce the third variable; f) decrypting the third variable with the asymmetric decrypt function and using the public key to generate a fourth variable and comparing the fourth variable with the generated random number and the received data message; g) in the event of a match, considering the untrusted chip and the data message to be valid; otherwise considering the untrusted chip and the data message to be invalid. (Indentation as in original. Go parse it yourself.)
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Commentary: This patent relates to protocols for determining whether an "untrusted chip", such as found on a smart card or identity card, is authentic. Most of these cards are RFID-based. A simple way to use RFID is where the card contains a static "key" that is transmitted to a card reader when passed in close proximity (e.g., getting access to my building elevator). But other uses of RFID involve a more dynamic protocol. That is, the card may actually perform computation -- typically of a cryptographic nature, such as a one-way hash function -- and spit back some computed value. These kinds of protocols are more secure, and are useful in cards used for commercial transactions, where counterfeiting would pose an extremely large financial risk. Interestingly, the preferred embodiment here isn't a smart card, but is a printer cartridge, as noted in the spec:
"Manufacturers of other systems that require consumables (such as a laser printer that requires toner cartridges) have struggled with the problem of authenticating consumables, to varying levels of success. Most have resorted to specialized packaging. However this does not stop home refill operations or clone manufacture. The prevention of copying is important to prevent poorly manufactured substitute consumables from damaging the base system. For example, poorly filtered ink may clog print nozzles in an ink jet printer, causing the consumer to blame the system manufacturer and not admit the use of non-authorized consumables."
(I love the rationale for why this copy-protection is needed -- because the manufacturer's reputation is at stake. Yeah, that's it... I recall a little DMCA lawsuit in Kentucky and the Sixth Circuit a few years back over this very issue, and I don't think it was about the plaintiff being blamed when third party cartridges jammed their give-away printers. It's all about the razor blades, baby. Expensive, proprietary razor blades.)
So, turning to Bilski, what makes this case fascinating is that the only "machine" tied-in here via claim language is an unknown entity: the "untrusted chip". (Reminds me of a classic law school case on federal jurisdiction, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.) That is, in order to satisfy 101, the particular machine is one that is entirely outside the actor's possession and control. Better still, the claimed method is essentially to test whether that unknown entity is actually a "proper" machine. (The more straightforward approach would have put the machine in there by making this a computer-implemented method, as well. Encryption/decryption using 128-bit keys can hardly be considered an otherwise manual process. And the figure really shows the "System 11" performing the steps of the method.)
Not bad.
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